INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology holds high prospects of improvement in agriculture, medicine and research.
1 Indeed, it promises to enhance food resources through genetic engineering, and make a wide range of products available -crops, fertilizers, pesticides, drugs, vaccines, and so on. However, despite this widespread acceptance of the prospective benefits of biotechnology, the grant of patents in this area raises some critical questions. For example, the debate continues as to what should or should not constitute patentable subject matter, as well as the possible effects of genetically-engineered organisms on human life and the environment. 2 Therefore, when it comes to international trade, particularly with regard to multilateral agreements, one of the biggest issues deals with the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in developing countries. Here, economic and legal questions tend to prevail over ethical considerations. 2. P. BLUNT, "Selective Breeding and the Patenting of Living Organisms", (1998) 48 Syracuse L. Rev., pp. 1365-1390, pp. 1375-76, discussing the arguments pro and con the application of genetic-engineering on living organisms.
3. Id., pp. 1375-76, noting that " [t] he risks involved in the development and the introduction of genetically organisms into the world at large will be balanced against the expected return on investment [...].
Seemingly, this is because the issues are raised, for the most part, in terms which oppose the "haves" and "have-nots", and the parties ultimately aim either to attain and maintain a competitive edge on the international market or to meet development goals. Worth recalling is that one major effect of IPR is to grant monopoly rights to those who invent new processes or products, for a certain period of time before their inventions are passed on to the public domain. Faced with this reality, farmers and indigenous communities in developing countries with huge biological endowments, are becoming increasingly critical of the patenting of plant varieties and its derivatives. Since biotechnology extends to both farming and genetic engineering, 4 by promising new economic prosperity and industrial uses, it will quite possibly continue to impact on the political and legal split between developed nations and developing countries. 5 In this paper we submit that intellectual property law, as it stands at present with respect to the patenting of biological innovations, fails to strike an appropriate balance between inventors' rights and local communities' rights in developing countries. This is due to the fact that conflicts still persist in recent international agreements which have attempted to address competing interests of the parties involved. This statement is also based on the assumption that developing countries are actually willing to exploit their biological resources; but, they find current international standards of patentability quite challenging.
Therefore, we start, in Section I, by locating the source of the current debate in the "customary" link between IPR and trade, which has been codified in the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). 6 The assessment of the rationale behind this marriage then leads us to examine the nature and legal foundations of complaints made by inventors from developed countries, on the one hand, and their counterparts in developing countries, on the other.
In Section II, we look at the way the North-South political and legal controversy has been addressed in recent international legal instruments designed to protect IPR. Moreover, we pay special attention to the underlying principles as well as the outstanding drawbacks. Starting with an opening note on the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 7 we focus our analysis on the International Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties, 8 as well as the aforementioned TRIPS Agreement, and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. 9 We concentrate, in Section III, on conflicts between the various social and political actors; by making a critical evaluation of the relationship between the aforementioned agreements, as well as by discussing recent trends which are quite possibly laying down new perspectives with respect to the design of an appropriate law. Therefore, the call for harmonization in the end, reflects our purpose : we do not intend to question the legitimate objectives of the agreements, but to situate them within the context of developing countries' emerging interests.
I. SOCIAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF BIOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS
The debate over biological innovations involves so many aspects that it gets somewhat confusing. issue from what is not, 10 it seems difficult to ignore the weight of the socio-economic problem when examining the relationship between the North and the South; particularly because the international legal instruments which we will analyse in the next section, set up a link between patent protection and international trade. In this section we propose to examine assumptions that justify the relationship between IPR and social economic development. We will then provide a summary explanation of divergent opinions of the parties involved, with regard to the need to protect biotechnological innovations.
A. WHY LINK PATENT PROTECTION TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE?
In any event, three assumptions seem to lay the foundation for a link between IPR and economic development : adequate IPR are beneficial to the developing countries in the long run, inadequate IPR cause financial losses to industrialized nations' businesses, and constitute a non-tariff barrier to trade. For example, the idea that IPR can be beneficial to the economy of developing nations certainly finds widespread support, 11 but some authors are sceptical about applying a 10. F.M. ABBOT, "Protecting First World Assets in the Third World : Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework", (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnafl L., pp. 689-745, pp. 697-98, arguing that the IPR issue deals with designing a mechanism to protect intangible wealth transferred from developed countries to developing countries, therefore, it seems erroneous to base the debate on the benefits likely to be drawn by developing countries as a consequence of their cooperation.
11. See generally R.T. RAPP, R.P. ROZEK, "Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries", 24 J. World Trade, pp. 75-102, pp. 77-81, arguing that the more effectively a country provides patent protection, the quicker it is likely to achieve economic development (p. 78). To support this assumption, they present an index of patent protection which ranks the level of protection on a scale of zero to five. Five corresponds to countries that fully comply with minimum standards proposed in the Guidelines for Standards for the Protection and Enforcement of Patents of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Intellectual Property Task Force (p. 79), while zero applies to countries with no patent protection at all. The conclusion, following a "regression analysis" is that Western countries with a strong patent law experience greater economic development. But see A.S. GUTTERMAN, "The NorthSouth Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights", (1993) 28 Wake Forest L. Rev., pp. 89-139, p. 118, n° 207, observing that "the scores were based solely on the laws as written and did not account for actual enforcement experience". cause and effect logic in this issue and even assert that the international patent system is not fit for developing countries. 12 The outcome of the altercation is that developing countries adhere to the patent system hoping that it will arguably prompt investments 13 p]atent protection acts as a stimulus for investment, not necessarily because it offers an expectation of increased profits, but rather because it offers a mechanism to exclude competitors from copying the subject invention". See also R.J. GUTOWSKI, loc. cit., note 12, p. 758, pointing to "compelling arguments" for developing countries to benefit from IPR in the long-run; namely the creation of "incentives for domestic and foreign researchers and entrepreneurs to invest resources in innovative technologies and solutions to problems indigenous to their countries". 14. 24 From what precedes, it follows that the positions held by the parties in relation to the protection of biological innovations diverge considerably. We will now attempt to examine these issues.
B. CONCERNS OF INVENTORS FOR A STRONG PATENT REGIME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
To begin with, the biotechnology patenting issue in developing countries derives from whether biological resources and its derivatives should be considered as a common heritage of humanity, 25 or as a matter subject to proprietary rights. To this respect, the opinion that prevails in developed nations is that plant breeders are entitled to monopoly rights over the products and processes which they claim as innovations. It is further argued that it does not cost much for developing countries to provide germplasm, 26 i.e. raw genetic materials and landraces. In addition, monopoly rights are the best incentive for research and advancement, likely to benefit developing countries as well. It is little wonder that the articulation of political and legal arguments under the new era of marriage between IPR and international trade have contributed in reviving traditional complaints by the biotechnology industry in the North, particularly in the area of pharmaceuticals. Nogués summarises this as follows : "Industrial countries complain that the domestic patent regimes of many developing countries are inadequate because : patent protection is too short; some industries such as pharmaceuticals are excluded; the legal enforcement of patent rights is weak; and too much emphasis is given to compulsory licensing".
28
Now that we have pointed out the essential issues, it might not be unwarranted to refer to a number of important arguments. Firstly, while in industrial countries long patent terms allow inventors to recover returns for a period generally extended to twenty years, in developing countries, on the contrary, the term rarely exceeds five years. 29 Though in some cases the period of protection might be relatively long, exclusion of substances used as food, medicine, or drugs will, among other factors, weaken such protection, in the second place. 30 It is worth mentioning that, as a general rule, countries enjoy discretion to implement policies that aim at protecting the public interest. Not surprisingly, it took time before some developed countries accepted to grant patents for "chemical products" (Germany), "non-medical pharmaceutical compositions" (France), or "food products" (Austria). 31 Even in the last decades, some countries like Canada, which share substantial costs for their health care system, would easily 30. For example, India's patent law in force prior to the TRIPS Agreement provides 14 years, except for inventions intended to be used as food, medicine or drug. As Adelman and Baldia note, the latter are subject to seven years from the filing date or five years from the date of sealing, "whichever is shorter". Again, in the event of opposition, the patent might expire before the opposition is concluded. See exclude drug products from patentability 32 Likewise, it is argued that such a practice, as carried out in developing countries, is a deliberate mechanism designed to free-ride high research and technology-based inventions. 33 Following along the same vein of statutory preclusion, one further assertion points to the fact that developing countries allow protection to pharmaceutical processes only, not to products. As Nogués explains, "[a] process-patent protects the product only if it is produced with it. Since small modifications of a formula create many ways of producing a chemical compound, process-patents are generally viewed as providing weak protection for pharmaceutical drug companies". 34 By way of consequence, this results in the proliferation of generic drugs, creating unfair competition and losses for the biotechnology industry from the North. 35 Ultimately, companies from developed countries consider compulsory licensing in developing nations as an intrusion into their private rights. An additional drawback is what is known as "working conditions". With this, developing countries willing to promote the development of local manufacturers, require as a prerequisite to the grant of a patent, that the invention be used in the country for a specified period of time 36 36. This first variation of the "working requirement" urges the patent-holder to use the patent in the market, so that in can effectively benefit the public. Companies are therefore discouraged from locking up their patents in a way that would serve anti-competitive purpose. See R. WEISSMAN, loc. cit., note 32, p. 1074. simply being imported. 37 However, the point of view voiced by developing countries runs quite opposite to the preceding arguments.
C. THE NEED TO PROMOTE LOCAL INTERESTS AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
To say that biological resources are a common heritage as understood by industrial countries, is not a view shared by developing countries. The potential effect of biotechnology patenting on consumers on the one hand, and the belief that it is possible to capitalize on biological resources for local development on the other, 38 have made developing countries critical of the current patent system. Their response to the complaints of patent holders can be stated as follows : the ownership of biological resources rests with the source country, the international patent system overlooks the contribution of local communities, and conventional standards of IPR promoted by developed countries fail to recognize indigenous knowledge.
The difference with regard to the principle of "common heritage", as applied to the ownership of genetic materials, was well reflected in the 1983 Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. 39 In this Undertaking, developing countries' opinions prevailed over those of industrial nations. For example, it was stated that not only raw materials were to be considered as common heritage of humanity, but also "elite and breeders' 37. Under this alternative, if a pharmeceutical company, for example, sells imported drugs instead of producing them locally, the patent protection might be withdrawn, ibid. See 40 This meant that developing countries could have free access to investment-intensive elite breeding materials, 41 just as industrial countries enjoy free access to genetic raw materials from developing countries. Consequently, no wonder the FAO Undertaking could not have any binding effect. Nevertheless, the concept of a "common heritage" was later on rejected, with the official recognition of breeders' rights. Also, farmers' rights were agreed upon as imposing a moral obligation to compensate developing countries. 42 Thus, the difficulty to reconcile breeders' rights, which create legal entitlements, with farmers' rights, which are moral by nature, leads to the equity issue. By means of illustration, the debate that is now extended to biotechnology inventions in general, started with the seed battle. have a share in genetic innovations. Therefore, opponents from the South state that laboratory applications are a mere extension of the original knowledge acquired through traditional breeding systems and centuries of on-field experience, 44 in pursuit of the same purposes. One well-publicized example, among others, of appropriation of indigenous knowledge, is the Neem tree found in India and very rich in chemical properties, which is now being exploited by American and Japanese companies, without sharing the benefits with farmers. 45 As a result, developing countries contend that they are unable to promote local communities' interests by complying with conventional IPR 46 . In addition, despite the "marriage" between IPR and international trade, the cultural gap with respect to the conception of IPR can be significant; 47 especially because in developed countries where patent rights aim to encourage innovations for technical advancement, and 44. V. SHIVA, id., p. 54 : "[G]enetic engineering and biotechnology only relocate existing genes rather than create new ones, the ability to relocate and separate is translated into the power and right to own. The power to own a part is then translated into the control of the entire organism". truly global economy and the paramount importance of technology and information point to the strong link between trade and IP. Even concerns about ideological imperialism and insensitivity to cultural differences are less than compelling today given the global movement towards market economies and free trade". disclosure in order to facilitate public use of innovations afterwards, prior publication, for example, destroys novlety. 48 Under this condition, it is difficult to protect innovations of indigenous communities, as will be further discussed in the following section.
II. THE LEGAL IMPACT OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The above sketch of the views of the interested parties has attempted to demonstrate that the patenting of plant varieties and its derivatives raises discord because there are crucial and divergent interests at stake. This has been exemplified by the failure of the FAO Undertaking to take IPRrelated issues away from the realm of policy considerations, in order to enshrine them into an international legally binding instrument. Noteworthy is that the 1883 Paris Conventions was the first attempt to harmonize the intellectual property law, but the original text remained mute as to what constitutes patentable subject matter. Even if the London revision introduced the term "industrial property" 49 so as to include the agriculture industry, 50 practice has confirmed the opinion that the provision in itself is discretionary, rather than mandatory. 49. See Paris Convention, article 1(3) which reads as follows : "Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and extractive industries and to all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour". expense of farmers' rights. 61 A survey of this system reveals at least three contentious issues which we will now attempt to discuss.
The first point of contention stems from the difference in the mode of protection provided respectively in the 1978 and 1991 texts. In the UPOV Convention (1978), member countries had a choice to protect breeders' rights either by grant of a special title of protection (a certificate) or by grant of a patent, but in principe, 62 double protection was not allowed. As for the UPOV Convention (1991), it has removed the prohibition of double protection by providing simply that "[e]aeh Contracting Party shall grant and protect breeders' rights". 63 Accordingly, developing countries fear that this is likely to encourage other countries to follow in the footsteps of the United States by granting plant patents.
64
The second controversial issue is that traditionally, breeders' rights created a double exception : One, known as "research exemption", allowed other breeders to use a protected variety so as to create other varieties, or to market such new varieties, without paying royalties; 65 the second one, known as "farmer exemption", permitted farmers to use and save protected seeds for future production, without paying royalties. 66 Under the UPOV Convention (1991), breeders' 68 Accordingly, failure to provide for such exemptions would entail an obligation to make arrangements like licencing, for the use of a patented variety in research, or royalties, for its use in farming.
A third stumbling block is rooted in the fact that standards of protection have been strengthened in a manner that makes UPOV a patent-like system of protection. To be protectable, a bred variety has to be new, Le. the "propagating or harvested material [...] has not been sold or otherwise disposed of to others"; uniform, that is "in its characteristics"; distinct, meaning "clearly distinguishable from any other variety"; and finally, stable, in the sense that "its relevant characteristics remain unchanged" in successive generations. 69 These conditions are criticized as creating a dichotomy between farmers' varieties and breeders' commercial varieties. Since the former can find it difficult to conform with the uniformity and stability standards, for example, they will eventually be denied protection.
70
Looking at the UPOV system from the angle of developing countries, and leaving aside its conflicts with respect to the biotechnology industry, leads one to the conclusion that this system, especially the UPOV Convention (1991), serves the interests of industrial countries, but overlooks those of developing countries. To quote Hamilton, "[t]he greater economic protection afforded by patents on plant varieties explains why this form of protection is favoured by American biotechnology companies and why the U.S. has promoted "patenting" of plant varieties in various international trade agreements". 71 With this said, we will now continue our investigation of the issue under discussion by surveying the TRIPS Agreement. 
B. BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTING IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
The Uruguay round of negotiations has been described as "[plerhaps the most significant forum for the promotion of the Northern view of the ownership of plant genetics". 72 Indeed, if one weights its results against the back drop of the concerns of the interested parties, as discussed in Section I, one might come to the conclusion that developed countries are the true winners. For instance, except for the provisions whose applications are subject to the transitional period, developing countries can no longer escape from the obligation to protect patent holders' rights for a period of no less than twenty years;
73 nor from the requirement to limit such rights only under certain conditions, 4 even though national legislative bodies are free to define "the kind and extent" of exceptions to be granted. 75 In addition, any country willing to resort to compulsory licensing has an obligation to conform to severe restrictions. 76 However, whether the TRIPS Agreement truly disfavours developing countries with respect to biotechnology patenting, is a matter that can be ascertained only if one examines the substantive provision that deals with the scope 72 76. TRIPS Agreement, art. 31. The general rule is that compulsory licencing applies only where the attempt to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions proves unsuccessful; unless the demand concerns national emergency or similar circumstances, in which case the right holder has to be notified and remunerated, taking into account the economic value of the authorization. Besides, any decision relating to the authorization can be subject to a judicial or independent review. See also K.W. MCCABE, loc. cit., note 13, p. 61, noting the extent of severe restrictions to compulsory licencing; CM. CORREA, id., p. 210, pointing out that the flexibility as to the grounds for granting compulsory licences is subject to the conditions specified by the TRIPS Agreement. M. and the conditions for patentability, namely Article 27. We will start by dealing with the scope of patentable subject matter before examining the conditions of patentability.
According to Article 27, Section 1, shall be patentable "any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application". Then follows the prohibition, in the same provision, of discrimination regarding the "place of invention", the "field of technology", and regarding the fact that "products are imported or locally produced". 77 This provision is considered as the major concession made by developing countries, since it allows no restriction as concerns patentable subject matter. 78 Furthermore, it arguably tends to put an end to working requirements. 79 In any case, under Section 2 of the same article, it is possible to exclude from patent protection, certain inventions on the grounds of ordre public or "morality", when it appears "necessary" to prevent their "commercial exploitation"; as well as "to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment", except where such preclusion is "made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law". 80 This public health clause would apparently allow developing countries, for instance, to exclude some substances, such as pharmaceutical products, from patentability. 81 However, the weight to be attached to this provision [...] by the fact that some importing of the patented subject matter would have to be allowed"; CM. CORREA, loc. cit., note 75, p. 203, concluding that "article 27(1) would not prohibit local production obligations!;,] but just the discrimination in the exercise of rights against infringing goods, whether imported or locally produced".
80. TRIPS Agreement, art. 27.2. 81. R. WEISSMAN, loc. cit., note 32, p. 1100: "Assuming the reason is legitimate, the exception will permit a country to deny patent to a particular drug or to all drugs". must be assessed against the conditions laid down for its application. Firstly, it is stated that the exclusion must be "necessary"; secondly, it must aim to prevent "commercial exploitation" of such products; and thirdly, it must not rely merely on the prohibition of the excluded products in domestic law. It seems rightful to assume that these limitations are likely to narrow the permissive language of Article 28.2. 82 On the other hand, this provision does not provide any guidance as to how it should be construed.
83 Therefore, equally reasonable is the assumption that an attempt to rely on it might be challenged within the framework of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO. With regard to the first paragraph of Section 3, it is stated that "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals", 84 also fall outside the ambit of patentable subject matter. This, in any case, runs parallel with preclusion of therapeutic methods in most countries. 85 Turning our attention to Article 27, Section 3, it starts by specifying, in the first paragraph, the kind of products and processes which will not be patentable. These are, "plants and animals", and "essentially biological processes for the produc- 83. The problem with the public health clause is two-fold : First, the exclusion must be "necessary", and second, it must aim to prevent" commercial exploitation" of the invention in question. Under GATT 1947 case-law, "necessary" has been construed as imposing an obligation on nations to resort to exceptional measures only if (1) another GATT-consistent measure is not available, and (2) the measure applied is "least-trade-restrictive". See R. WEISSMAN, loc. cit., note 32, p. 1103. But the latter test appears to be "favored". See T.G. ACKERMANN, id., p. 507. Thus, Weissman suggests "[a] less stringent reading of "necessary" -something closer to important, and with little or no attention to available alternative", R. WEISSMAN, id., p. 1107. As concerns "commercial exploitation", it seems that a country would be justified to deny protection to foreign patent-holders only if commercial exploitation of the invention by domestic entities is not allowed either, R. WEISSMAN will in effect be excluded remains disputable. For example, professor Correa has suggested that if it is possible to interpret the exclusion of "plants and animals" broadly, as embracing animal races and animal plant species, the same can not be said about "essentially biological processes".
87
Referring, by way of analogy, to the patent law of the countries member to the European Patent Convention, 88 he argues that the criteria retained to interpret "essentially biological processes" is the degree of "human intervention". 89 As a result, "classical breeding methods are not patentable. In contrast, methods based on genetic engineering (e.g. the production of a 'transgenic' plant) where the technical intervention is significant, would be patentable". 90 As for "micro-organisms" and "non-biological processes" it is expressly provided that they shall be patentable.
Yet another hurdle for developing countries lies in the second subparagraph of Article 27, Section 3, which deals with "plant varieties" specifically. This provision mandates Members to provide protection for plant varieties "either by patents or by an effective sui generis system". 91 Since this provision also aims to assure that minimum IPR are provided for in developing countries, we have kept the discussion for the last section of this paper. Suffice to say along with professor Correa that "[t]his obligation is another important basis for 87 the expansion of the scope of intellectual property in the field most developing countries have neglected until now".
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With regard to the conditions of patentability, an invention must be new, involve an inventive step (non obvious), and be capable of industrial application (useful). Gana has rightly called these new standards a "deceptively simple terminology", contending that they "invoke a body of jurisprudence which has been carefully developed and applied by courts in developed countries for years"; and which, insofar as developing countries are concerned, represent the results of their "accession to international agreements, rather than the working out of ideas about the patent system emanating from the individual countries". 93 However strong this argument might be, the fact is that these standards hardly apply, if at all, to traditional breeding methods and indigenous knowledge. This view is not unsupported if we consider, for example, novelty. The fact that accounts of the uses of traditional medical remedies of indigenous communities have been published or used by scientists of all background, is quite well-documented. 94 Again, as many would argue, even if such publication manifestly destroys novelty and renders such remedies non-patentable, 95 it does not follow that pharmaceutical companies, for instance, will not be able to use such knowledge or substances in laboratory and patent their results. 94. M. BLAKENEY, loc. cit., note 47, p. 299, referring to the practice of ethnobotanists and ethnopharmacologists. See also R. WEISSMAN, loc. cit., note 32, p. 1090, noting that "corporate botanists and anthropologists rely on third world farmers and herbalists, especially from indigenous communities that make their home in or live off of the rain forests, to direct them to plants that they use in local medicines".
95. M. BLAKENEY id., p. 299, arguing that publication "may have the effect of destroying the novelty of therapeutic claims". See also R.L. GANA, loc. cit., note 31, pp. 749-750 : "Developed countries are likely to treat such traditional medicines or cultural knowledge as a product of nature or decide they do not satisfy novelty requirements".
96. R.L. GANA, id., p. 750, arguing that it is possible for a pharmaceutical company to "take the raw formula or components of a native medicine and work on it until it satisfies the patentability requirements". See also R. WEISMAN, loc. cit., note 32, p. 1090, asserting that "the pharmaceutical companies are able to synthesize chemical substances with mild alterations and patent them".
The preceding review of the TRIPS Agreement points to the conclusion that the concerns of developed countries have been given extensive consideration, whereas much remains to be done with regard to the interests of developing countries. Of course, there are a few exclusionary provisions, but it can be argued that their effects have been watered down considerably by somewhat ambiguous underlying conditions. Besides, the failure to consider farmers' rights or traditional knowledge of local communities suggests that such concepts do not fit, as yet, into the current regime of IPR. Now, if it is true that the TRIPS Agreement has failed to protect the interests of the latter, the CBD seems to have adopted quite a different approach.
C. INNOVATIONS IN THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The CBD is the most known outcome of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Many think of it as the major breakthrough managed by developing countries, but it is certainly an attempt to reconcile the interests of the North and those of the South with regard to biotechnology. Three objectives are contemplated : "the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources". 97 The perception that the CBD meets the expectations of developing countries is premised on the ownership of genetic resources, access to technology, and IPR on biological innovations of indigenous communities.
The point about ownership of genetic resources is that the principle of "common heritage of humanity" has been rejected, 98 although some issues remain pending and their 97. CBD, art. 1. 98. See supra, Section I.C. for more on this topic. However, one commentator argues that the fact that the Preamble to the CBD states that the conservation of biological diversity is a "common concern of humankind" is meaningful, because States have now confirmed that biodiversity is a "commons", which entails an obligation to conserve it. See K. BOSSELMANN, loc. cit., note 26, pp. 137-138. discussion would extend the scope of this paper." Instead, it is established that States have sovereign rights over their natural resources, and the authority to determine access to genetic resources. 100 One is tempted to think that measures taken in this sense, are limited only by "the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of [these] genetic resources". 101 Except that the same article affirms that "[ajcces [to genetic resources] [...] shall be on mutually agreed terms", 102 thus creating an ambiguity as discussed below.
Next, we will consider the question of access to protected technology. On this point, the CBD is challenged by its opponents for stipulating that "[a]ccess to and transfer of technology [...] to developing countries shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms". 103 Further still, developed countries "shall take legislative, administrative or policy measure [...] with the aim that [...] developing countries, which provide genetic resources are provided access to and transfer of technology which makes uses of those resources, on mutually agreed terms, including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights".
104
The history of the CBD itself shows that the language used in Article 16 was at the core of the United States' initial refusal to sign the on IPR "as a constraint to the transfer of technology rather than a prerequisite". 106 No wonder expressions like "equitable share", "fair and most favourable terms", rapidly triggered the Unites States' unilateral interpretation of the CBD, in order to satisfy the demands of the biotechnology industry.
107 Fears expressed by the latter being that the CBD urges inventors to transfer technology and disregard compensation; proposes the sharing of the income; and "creates the potential for sweeping forfeiture of intellectual property rights". 108 Last, but certainly not least, is the recognition of indigenous and traditional knowledge. Article 8(j) calls on each Contracting party to "respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity". It also requires States to "encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices".
109
With these stipulations, it is expected that equity will finally find its way into the field of IPR. As discussed previously, plant varieties are not excluded from protection under the TRIPS Agreement. To this effect, Members are required to "provide for the protection of plant varieties either by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof', 113 to make sure that minimum standards of IPR are catered to.
114 But, even though no specific reference is made to the UPOV Convention therein, the controversial expression "effective sui generis system" has been widely interpreted by many as limiting developing countries' choice of a system of protection to one that is already internationally available.
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In such an interpretation, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV Convention seems to be taken for granted. And yet, this can stand only if it is ascertained that the UPOV Convention is likely to meet the goals of developing countries. Moreover, even if it is suggested that nations from the South are free to design a system of their own, provided that it be "effective", conflicts remain possible. In fact, the TRIPS Agreement does not define what is an "effective" system. So, to what extent are the UPOV Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD likely to conflict regarding biotechnology patenting? What options are worth exploring in an attempt to reconcile the respective interests of the parties?
A. WHERE THE AGREEMENTS CONFLICT
Following roughly the same pattern developed in the previous analysis, this subsection starts by comparing the UPOV Convention vis-à-vis the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, then focusses on the relationship between these latter. Compared to the TRIPS Agreement, the UPOV Convention can be criticized for leading to results that counter the objective of free trade, by imposing non-tariff barriers and anti-competitive practices.
116 It further appears more objectionable when compared to the CBD. To be sure, drawbacks seem to derive from the fact that the UPOV Convention narrows farmers' rights as 117 Farmers' right to save the seed, for instance, is consonant with the objective of conservation of biological diversity in the CBD. This objective, according to some authors, is particularly weakened by the fact that the UPOV Convention provides a patent-like protection. While this conforms with the TRIPS Agreement, opponents argue that "[t]he privatization of patented genetic resources accelerates the trend toward monocultural cropping". 118 However, another view contends that "creation of new plant varieties by definition increases the actual diversity of species, and if genetic barriers can be eliminated through genetic engineering, there will arguably be an increase of botanical diversity as well".
119 Following this trend, the UPOV Convention would still be a good option for developing countries for two reasons : its field of application has been extended to "the entire kingdom [of plants] and not just species of interest to individual countries" and to "newly discovered as well as newly bred varieties". 120 Looking at the issue this way, developing countries would enjoy "competitive opportunities" and, at the same time, contribute to the increase of biological diversity. 121 In any event, this view, which might certainly be appealing to commercial breeders in developing countries, leaves unresolved the question of recognition of the rights of indigenous communities. While the CBD is quite explicit on this point, the UPOV Convention just as the TRIPS Agreement, remains silent.
With regards to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, there are three possible areas of conflict : the principle of national sovereignty, the recognition of indigenous knowledge, and the acknowledgement of community rights. Firstly, the principle of national sovereignty established by the CBD, can be understood either as allowing developing countries to stop bio-piracy, very common in the past, 122 or as enabling them to enact legislation that excludes plant varieties from patentability 123 . In this way, the CBD would clash with the TRIPS requirement of biotechnology patenting.
Secondly, the CBD recognizes indigenous knowledge, which includes "innovations and practices", 124 as well as its contribution to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The problem is that, in light of this contribution, the CBD imposes on Contracting parties an obligation that has no equivalent in the TRIPS Agreement : to share the benefits of biological inventions. The TRIPS Agreement, instead, allows patents "in all fields of technology" without compensation. 125 At any rate, if it is true that Article 7(j) of the CBD creates communal IPR as discussed previously, there is no need to insist that this is at odds with the TRIPS Agreement. Should indigenous communities, where "the knowledge is held by communities instead of just a single owner", claim their share for providing the "novel" information, such claims are irreconcilable with the individualistic view that prevails in the international patent system. 126 However, it might be possible to address these discrepancies. We will now explore some significant options.
B. TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES
Groups involved in the debate concerning the agreements at issue are many; as are suggestions put forward so that countries privy to these agreements can fulfil their obli-gâtions. All in all, three options seem consistent with what we have discussed in this paper : sui generis systems of protection, contractual arrangements at a bilateral level, and the amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. The latter's requirement for a sui generis system of protection has had the effect of almost doubling membership in the UPOV system. For example, from January 1, 1994 to June 29, 1999 twenty new members have joined, which brings the total to 44 States. 127 In any case, the sui generis option can also mean freedom of choice. India took the lead in 1997 by drawing up a draft legislation "to protect its biological resources from being exploited by foreigners without sharing the benefits with local people" and by setting up the National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) to implement the legislation, 128 but, only to meet strong opposition from the United States Government. 129 So far, most developing countries seem to have resisted the pressure as well, and many non-UPOV sui generis systems of protection are being drafted.
130 They aim to promote farmers' rights, to preserve local community rights, and to set up conditions for patentable matter in a way that serves local interests.
This option is more in line with the CBD, and actually, it is an attempt to fill the gap left by the TRIPS Agreement. As a result, some critics question its efficacy, since they think that it "tends to slow and even to block the flow of trade between nations". 131 In the second place, are contractual arrangements. Their possible justification is that "[t]he Biodiversity Convention provides the framework for the development of minimum standards for national regulation of transactions involving both the public and the private 127 sector". 132 In fact, article 7(j) requires, for such dealings, "the approval and involvement of the holders of [...] knowledge, innovations and practices". 133 In practice, biological prospecting contracts, referred to as "gene-hunting", have been taking place between governmental or non-governmental entities located in the South and pharmaceutical or other research bodies based in the North. The former provide samples which will be analysed for possible applications in medicine, agriculture and industry, in exchange of royalties, and conservation facilities or potential commercial benefits. 134 This option has been extensively encouraged by many commentators. 135 Despite a number of prospective advantages, 136 this solution poses first of all the question of developing countries' capacity to handle the hurdles and costs of possible action against multinational firms for violation of their rights resulting from screening contracts. 137 Then, the right to sell national resources is questioned by some environmental groups, for example, as well as some parliaments that consider biodiversity as part of the "national patrimony". 138 Another concern is that biological screening can turn into biopiracy, given the degree of opportunism. As Tejera asserts, "[contractual relations between individual tribes will only succeed under a structured international trading system". 139 colliding with each other, 146 but, in practice, it would bring clarity vis-à-vis the UPOV Convention and predictability as regards any measure the parties might wish to take.
CONCLUSION
Biotechnology patenting is a very complex and controversial issue. In the perspective we have adopted here, this is due to the fact that it opposes gene-endowed, but technologically deprived countries from the South, to gene-hunting, but technologically rich nations from the North. Moreover, this raises serious questions as to the ownership of genetic raw matériels, the protection of its derivatives, and sharing of the benefits.
As a result, the international intellectual property law in its recent developments, fails to address these issues harmoniously. It tends, instead, to keep pace with advancement in the biotechnology industry. For this reason, the UPOV system has been reinforced to provide patent-like protection to commercial breeders. This situation seems to leave traditional breeders behing, not just because farmers' privileges have been deleted, but also because the new standards of protection hardly apply to landraces and traditional knowledge.
As for the TRIPS Agreement, it is less concerned, in its objectives, with the need to harmonize IPR than by the desire to set up minimum intellectual property standards, so that greater protection can be afforded to industrial forces. Thus, it remains clear that plant varieties are patentable subject matter. The language in the TRIPS Agreement gives developed countries a better bargaining position, because if they cannot achieve biotechnology patenting under this regime, they can push toward the UPOV Convention. Developing countries on their side, have a strong hold on the CBD, which takes into account the rights of local communities, despite the ambiguity and vagueness of its wording. 146 . But see M. HALEW00D, loc. cit., note 76, pp. 280-281, stating that if these agreements deal with the same subject matter, "then, based on the Vienna Convention, TRIPS would prevail over the CBD, and parties to both agreements would be obliged to comply with TRIPS where the two agreements applied equally to any given legal initiative". Therefore, the conflicts between these agreements stem from differences in their respective objectives. Consequently, this compels developing countries, for example, to perceive the issue from different angles all at the same time. Moreover, as providers of genetic materials, they fear bio-piracy believing that these resources have the potential to develop their economy; while, as consumers of protected technology, they fear being denied access to accessible markets as well as conservation consideration, in terms of local industry. Thus, it goes without saying that the way from fear to "fair dealing" passes through the harmonization of the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD. At any rate, whether the parties are willing to bridge the gap between them remains to be seen. 
